Before the Call — Texas Hill Country Floods

The Kerrville dispatcher asked for backup at approximately 4 a.m. — while already managing a flood MCI on two phones simultaneously. That timing matters. Here's what the decision looks like:

• Know your threshold before the incident — The decision to call for backup should be protocol-driven, not a judgment call made at hour three of a mass casualty event. Does your center have a defined call volume or incident type that automatically triggers a recall? If not, who holds that authority?
• The supervisor or on-call lieutenant can authorize recall — A single call out of queue to reach your supervisor is less harmful than letting another 40 callers go unanswered. The sooner you ask, the sooner help arrives.
• Mutual aid dispatch exists for this — Multiple centers took overflow 911 calls during Hurricane Helene. Kerr County reportedly transferred some calls to neighboring dispatch centers. Do you know which center would take yours, how that routing works, and who initiates it?
• You cannot triage callers you haven't answered — At some saturation point, speed of pickup becomes more important than duration of call. Quick location confirmation + "help is coming, get to high ground" may be the best you can offer — and it's still better than ringing out.

This is one of the hardest dispatching problems in a mass-casualty flood: every repeat caller is a person whose situation has gotten worse, and every answered call means someone else is still on hold.

• Document location on first call, update on callbacks — CAD notes should capture where they were, what they reported, and what you told them. When they call back, you're not starting over.
• Treat callbacks as priority updates — A callback usually means the situation escalated. Floor → attic → roof is a real-time survival curve. If you can, flag these in CAD for responding units.
• Give callers a self-rescue instruction and a reason to stay off the line — "Get to the highest point in the structure. Keep this line clear so I can send help to you and others. I have your location." Not a dismissal — a directive that keeps them focused and frees your line.
• Track "last known" vs. "confirmed rescue" — Your CAD notes during a flood should differentiate between people you've dispatched resources to and people you've only talked to. That list is your accountability record when the event is over.

This is the most consequential systems question this incident raises. Here's the breakdown:

• WEA (Wireless Emergency Alert) — Pushes to all phones in a geographic area automatically when NWS issues certain warning types. The 1:14 a.m. flash flood warning likely triggered one. But WEAs from NWS cannot include evacuation instructions — only the county can do that.
• IPAWS (Integrated Public Alert & Warning System) — The federal system that lets authorized local agencies push alerts to all phones in a defined area, regardless of carrier or whether the recipient has signed up for anything. Same system as Amber Alerts. Kerr County was authorized to use it but did not during the critical overnight hours.
• CodeRED — An opt-in system. Reaches only people who have registered. In Kerr County, some people received it after 10 a.m. The volunteer firefighter requesting CodeRED activation at 4:22 a.m. was the actual trigger — it wasn't proactively pushed by officials.

For your center specifically, know:

• Who is authorized to activate IPAWS in your jurisdiction?
• Does that authority rest with dispatch, the Emergency Management coordinator, the Sheriff, or the County Judge?
• What is the protocol when that person is asleep or unreachable at 3 a.m.?
• Is there a pre-scripted IPAWS message template ready for flash flood events, or does someone have to write it from scratch?

This call came in at 4:19 a.m. — more than two hours before Camp Mystic's co-director called requesting search and rescue. It was the earliest actionable indicator that something catastrophic had happened upstream.

• Treat it as a SAR trigger, not just a welfare check — Two girls swept downstream from a children's camp in a flood is not an isolated rescue. It is a leading indicator of a mass casualty event at the camp. Ask: "Do you know how many more were at the camp? Are there other campers unaccounted for?"
• Document and flag immediately — This information needs to reach your supervisor and IC, not sit in a CAD note. Dispatchers in Kerr County were managing hundreds of calls simultaneously. The mechanism for escalating critical upstream intelligence during a saturated event needs to exist before you need it.
• Connect the dots in CAD — Every call from the Hunt area, the Guadalupe River corridor, and anywhere near Camp Mystic in this window should be linked in your event record. When a SAR request finally comes in from the camp at 7:22 a.m., responders should be able to see the full picture going back to 3:57 a.m.
• This is why NWS called dispatch at 4:32 a.m. — NWS called Kerr County Sheriff's Office asking if roads were closed and if it was flooding. NWS was doing information triangulation. Dispatch should be doing the same in reverse — sharing field intelligence upstream to agencies that can act on it.

The dispatcher's response is honest and operationally accurate. Responders had tried and were unable to reach the camp due to roads being impassable. But it lands as "we failed to reach you" when the caller is standing in a disaster asking for help.

A stronger response preserves the honesty while giving the caller something actionable:

• Acknowledge the scope explicitly — "I'm logging 20 to 40 missing. I'm escalating this to search and rescue command right now."
• Get the specific information you need for air and water resources — Roads are out, so the next question is access. "Is there a landing zone available at the camp? Can you give me GPS coordinates or your best landmark?" A helicopter or boat needs different location information than a ground unit.
• Give a status, not a dead end — "We have swift water rescue teams staged. The road to you is cut off but we are working alternate access. Stay on your high ground, keep survivors together, and call back if your situation changes." That's not a promise of immediate rescue — it's a meaningful update that gives a frightened person something to hold onto.
• Document the count immediately and flag it — "20 to 40 missing" at a children's camp is an MCI declaration. That number needs to be in your CAD record, on your supervisor's radio, and in the command text thread within 60 seconds of this call.

Multiple callers in Kerr County called to offer help. "I know you're overwhelmed, but I'm wondering if a group of us could search — and how and where we can start looking." At 6:11 a.m., someone described actively trying to rescue a man caught on a fence in the river using a rope. This is going to happen in your center too.

• Do not send civilians into active floodwater — Kerr County dispatchers told callers they were not accepting outside volunteer searches because it was too dangerous. That's the right call. Untrained rescuers in fast-moving water become additional victims. Swift water rescue is a specialty for a reason.
• Redirect their energy to something useful — "The best thing you can do right now is stay clear of the water and call us if you see someone who needs rescue." Give them a role that doesn't put them at risk.
• Log civilian rescue activity in CAD — When people do attempt rescues regardless of your direction, document it. The person described helping two girls at 4:19 a.m. is now part of your incident record. It protects them legally and helps you piece together where victims came from.
• Know your formal volunteer activation pathway — Many counties have citizen emergency response teams (CERT) or established volunteer SAR assets. If those exist in your jurisdiction, you need to know who activates them and when — not figure it out during the event.

The Kerrville chief commended his dispatchers publicly. That matters. But recognition is not a wellness plan. The 911 community consistently undertreats the psychological impact of high-casualty events on telecommunicators — in part because dispatchers are not on scene, and therefore their trauma is treated as secondary or invisible.

What actually helps:

• Critical incident stress debriefing (CISD) — A structured peer-and-professional debrief in the 24–72 hours following the event. Not a check-in. An actual facilitated process with someone trained to run it.
• Peer support access — Does your center have a peer support program? If not, APCO and NENA both have frameworks. A dispatcher who experienced a similar event is often more useful than a counselor who hasn't.
• Know your own early warning signs — Sleep disturbance, hypervigilance on shift, intrusive memories of specific calls, numbness, irritability, avoidance of certain call types. These are normal responses to abnormal events. They become a problem when untreated.
• EAP is not a substitute — Employee assistance programs offer counseling, but generic therapy is not the same as trauma-informed care for first responders. Know whether your center can refer you to a provider who understands the work.