Before the Call — Hurricane Helene, Western NC
Hurricane Helene made landfall in Florida on September 26, 2024, and drove catastrophic flooding and wind damage deep into the mountains of western North Carolina — a region with no history of tropical storm impacts at this scale. By the morning of September 27, nineteen 911 call centers in the western part of the state had been forced offline. Road infrastructure was destroyed. Cell towers were down. Communities in Buncombe, McDowell, and surrounding counties were cut off from the outside world.
North Carolina's Next Generation 911 network did what it was designed to do: it rerouted calls. Nineteen impacted PSAPs transferred their emergency call loads to twenty-three non-impacted centers across the state. Some calls from Swannanoa — a western NC community that bore catastrophic flood damage — were routed 300 miles east to the Fayetteville 911 Call Center. In a three-hour window on the morning of September 27, more than 1,000 calls flooded Fayetteville's lines.
Fayetteville dispatchers were talking to people they couldn't locate, in terrain they didn't know, about a disaster 300 miles away. People were in floating homes. Kids were clinging to trees. One dispatcher guided a woman through options for escaping a flooding house — water rising, no attic access — and told her she might need an ax or chainsaw to breach the roof. The line went dead. "I don't know whatever happened to that family," Jennifer Osborn later said. "I think about that from time to time."
Newton Communication Center in Catawba County fielded more than 6,000 phone calls and dispatched over 1,600 calls for service in five days. The McDowell County center lost infrastructure lines entirely and rolled to Johnston County. The NG911 system worked. What it couldn't change was that the people answering those calls were guessing at geography, had no local resource knowledge, and were making life-or-death decisions in communities they had never seen.
This is the reality Fayetteville dispatchers faced on September 27. They were the last point of contact for people in crisis — in terrain they didn't know, with road names they didn't recognize. This situation will happen again. Thinking through it before you're in it is the point.
- Name and location first, always. Before anything else: caller's name, their address or best description of location, and a callback number. In a situation where you may lose the line, this information is your only lifeline to getting resources there after the call drops. Get it first.
- Use the caller as your local expert. "What's the nearest intersection, landmark, or road name you can see?" The caller knows their geography. Your job is to extract and document it clearly enough that a rescue crew — or a helicopter — can find them.
- Be honest about your limitations without abandoning the caller. "I'm not in your area and I'm working to get you connected to local resources — stay on the line with me." That is not a failure. That is accurate information that helps the caller understand the situation while you work it.
- Know your escalation path. During a NG911 reroute event, your supervisor should be working to establish contact with emergency management or incident command in the affected area. Your job is to stabilize the caller and document. Their job is to get you resource contacts.
Jennifer Osborn's statement — "I don't know whatever happened to that family. I think about that from time to time" — is one of the most honest things a dispatcher has said publicly about this work. A call ends with no resolution. You did everything right. The line went dead. You'll never know.
This is not rare in catastrophic events. It is the cost of the job — and it is real, even when the culture doesn't make space to say so.
- Name what happened. Not every call gets resolved. Some end because the person ran out of time, or signal, or options. That needs to be processed differently than a normal call. If your debrief culture doesn't have a mechanism for naming unresolved calls, it's not a complete debrief culture.
- Document what you did — for yourself as much as the record. Write down what you told them, what they said, and what the situation was when the line went dead. That documentation can feed search and rescue handoff, but it also externalizes the event. You are less likely to keep re-running something you've written down completely.
- Separate outcome from action. The outcome of that call was not in your control once the line went dead. The actions you took — asking the right questions, giving accurate guidance, staying calm — were in your control. They are different things.
- This is moral injury, not guilt. You didn't do anything wrong. The weight you're carrying is from doing everything right and still not knowing if it was enough. That injury responds poorly to "you did your best." It responds better to named support from people who understand what dispatch work actually involves.
PSAP continuity of operations planning is federally recommended and required for many centers, but implementation quality varies widely. Hurricane Helene is a case where the technical systems executed a successful reroute because that reroute had been planned in advance. The centers receiving overflow had also prepared for surge scenarios.
- Know your center's COOP plan by name and location. Not "I think we have one" — know where it is, who owns it, and when it was last updated. A plan from 2015 for infrastructure that has since changed may not reflect how a reroute actually works today.
- Know your primary backup PSAP. If your center goes offline, which center receives your calls? Have you ever spoken to them? Do you have their direct emergency number?
- Know your backup communications. What happens to radio traffic if your primary infrastructure fails? Is there a backup dispatch point, a mobile unit, a secondary facility? Who has keys to it?
- Know the public-facing piece. If your center goes offline, how do residents know to call somewhere else? Who issues that notification and through which channel?
In a catastrophic event, the definition of "emergency" shifts moment to moment. A welfare check for a missing family member might be the first notification that a community is cut off and needs helicopter rescue. A supply request might come from someone with critical medical needs who doesn't know how to frame it. Meanwhile, active water rescue calls compete for the same dispatcher time.
- Mass call triage requires a policy decision, not case-by-case dispatcher judgment. "Route missing person reports to 211" is a policy your supervisor or ICS establishes. You implementing it is execution. Those are different things, and the second requires the first.
- 211 and 311 are only useful if people can reach them. The Governor's guidance assumed callers had functioning cell or phone service. Many in western NC did not. Alternative systems absorb volume only from people who can access them — which may not be the people in the most acute need.
- Caller framing can disguise priority. "I just need to report my mom is missing" may describe a mother who is actively in danger. A single triage question — "When did you last hear from her? Was she in the flood area?" — takes 20 seconds and can change the call classification entirely.
- Document every call, even triaged ones. In a mass event, your call logs become part of the missing persons record. Don't sacrifice documentation quality because you're in surge mode.
✍️ Your Reflection
Complete this section and print your response — or save a PDF to share with your supervisor.